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ABSTRACT 
 
In light of the rise of malicious attacks on the Internet and the various networks and 
applications attached to it, new approaches towards modeling predatory activity in 
networks is called for.  Past research has simulated networks assuming that all vertices 
are homogenously susceptible to attack or infection.  Often times in real world 
networks only subsets of vertices are susceptible attack or infection in a heterogeneous 
population of vertices.  One approach to examining a heterogeneous network 
susceptible to attack is modeling cyberspace as a predator prey landscape.  If each type 
of vulnerable device is considered a heterogeneous species what level of species 
diversification is needed to keep a malicious attack from a causing a catastrophic failure 
to the entire network.  This paper explores the predator prey analogy for the Internet 
and presents findings on how different levels of species diversification effects network 
resilience.  The paper will also discuss the connection between diversification, 
competition, anti-trust, and national security. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The “next big thing” in cyberspace is no longer glitzy new technologies, but malicious agents 
that have been wreaking havoc on the Internet, such as viruses, worms, Trojans and denial of 
service attacks (Economist 2003).  While the problem of malicious agents has been widely 
studied relatively there is significantly less research that has endeavored to look at the problem 
from a theoretical or policy perspective.  This paper will look at the problem utilizing the 
theoretical under pinning of predator prey models from biological science as well as recent 
research in network complexity and mechanics. 
 
Recent research has found that several critical technological networks are scale free structures 
with power law connectivity distributions, such as the Internet at the autonomous system level 
and the router level (Faloutsos et al 1999), the World Wide Web (Ba rabasi et al 1999, Huberman 
and Adamic 1999), and physical SDH telecommunications networks (Spencer and Sacks 2003).  
Studies have examined the vulnerability of scale free networks finding that they are resilient to 
random attacks, but highly susceptible to targeted attacks (Albert et al 2000).  Researchers have 
also examined the immunization of scale free networks including the Internet, finding that 
targeted immunization strategies work well, while random strategies fail to eradicate a virus 
below an epidemic threshold (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani 2001, Pastor-Satorras and 
Vespignani 2002, Dezsos and Barabasi 2002).  These studies, though, have analyzed scale free 
networks assuming that all vertices are homogenously susceptible to attack or infection.  Often 
times in real world networks only subsets of vertices are susceptible to attack or infection in a 
heterogeneous population of vertices.  One example of such a scenario is Internet worms, which 
are designed to attack/exploit only specific operating systems or platforms.  One approach to 
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examining a heterogeneous network susceptibility to attack is as a predator prey system.  If each 
type of vulnerable device is considered a heterogeneous species, what level of species 
diversification is needed to keep a malicious attack from a causing a catastrophic failure to the 
entire network?  To answer this question first a predator prey typology for the Internet will be 
introduced, followed by a review of predator prey research in other fields, and finally a 
methodology for applying a predator prey model to the Internet with preliminary results and 
conclusions. 
 
A PREDATOR PREY TYPOLOGY 
 
The Internet and the wide array of networks and applications interconnected to it are plagued by 
a variety of malicious agents, ranging from viruses to worms to denial of service attacks.  In 
analogy, the Internet can be viewed as an ecosystem that connects a wide variety of habitats such 
as routers, servers, operating systems (OS), etc. These habitats can further be delineated by the 
species that reside in them, for example a router habitat could comprise of Cisco, Juniper, 
Lucent, and Nortel species of routers.  Using the Internet as an ecosystem analogy the malicious 
attacks outlined above (worms, viruses, etc.) can be seen as predators and their interaction with 
ecosystem (servers, routers, OS’s) as a predator prey relationship.  A sample typology of a 
predator prey ecosystem with examples can be viewed in figure 1.   
Figure 1. Predator Prey Sample Typology for the Internet 
· Ecosystem  - The Internet 
o Habitats 
§ Routers 
· Species 
o Cisco 
o Juniper 
o Lucent 
o Nortel 
§ Servers 
· Species 
o Microsoft - IIS 
o Apache 
o Unix 
o BSD 
§ Operating Systems 
· Species 
o Microsoft – Windows 
o Macintosh 
o Unix 
o Linux 
§ Email Applications 
· Species 
o Microsoft – Exchange 
o Web based email 
§ Hotmail 
§ Yahoo 
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§ AOL 
§ Netscape 
 
 
This paper will attempt examine how a predator prey analogy can be modified to the Internet in 
order to gain insight into the dynamics and security of the system.  To do so a quick review of 
the fundamental ideas behind predator prey models will be covered, followed by how these 
models can be adapted to the Internet, how these models can provide insight into improved 
Internet security and stability, and the policy implications of these findings.    
 
Lotka-Volterra Approach 
 
The literature around the ideas of predator prey models is well developed.  The mathematical 
beginning to predator prey models was the competition models independently created by Lotka 
(1925) and Volterra (1926).  The Lotka-Volterra models explained oscillations in populations 
between competing species.  In simple terms when there is a large number of prey the 
environment is good for predators and their population increases.  This predator population 
increases until there are not enough prey to sustain the population and then the predator 
population decreases.  The decrease in predators then leads to an increase in prey since there are 
fewer predators consuming them.  This oscillating relationship between predators and prey can 
be mathematically expressed as:  
 dH = H(a - aP) 
 dt  
 dP = P(-b + bH) 
 dt  
· H(t) and P(t) represent the magnitude of prey and predator populations respectively.   
· a is the growth rate of the prey population in the absence of predators.   
· b is the rate at which a predator population will decrease without sufficient amount of 
prey to feed upon.   
· a and b  measure the negative impact of predators on prey and the positive impact of prey 
on predators, respectively. 
(Waage and Mills 1992) 
 
The basic linear Lotka-Volterra model has been modified to examine non- linear relationships 
(Paine 1966, Paine and Hanski 1998), cooperation among competitors (Zhang 2003), enhanced 
stability (Gonzales-Olivares and Ramos-Jiliberto 2003), and geographic effects (Tainaka 2003) 
to name just a few of the models and researchers’ extensions.  The Lotka-Volterra model has 
also been used to explain relationships other than the predator prey dynamics in biology, 
including such diverse disciplines as economics, chemistry, physics, mathematics, geography, 
and demography.  This research proposes applying the predator prey model to a new area, 
complex networks, specifically the Internet and the wide variety of malicious attacks it faces. 
Previous work points towards applying predator prey models to the Internet as being a fruitful 
endeavor.  Lopez et al (2003) found that Lotka-Volterra equations could reproduce the 
competitive structure of a complex network of web sites.  Further, Solomon (1997) found that a 
generalized Lotka-Volterra equation produces a power law probability distribution, specifically 
with the distribution of wealth in a simulated market.  Both papers indicate that Lotak-Volterra 
models could produce the competitive forces and resulting network structure seen in scale free 
networks.  While this paper will not address this issue directly the possible connection is an 
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important one as a predator prey model for the Internet is developed, since it has been widely 
found to be a scale free network at several levels (Falustosos et al 1999, Albert et al 1999). 
 
Predator-Prey for the Internet 
 
The first step in developing a predator prey model for the Internet is to outline how electronic 
predators and prey differ from what is found in the natural world.  To begin this one needs to 
define what a predator and prey will be in terms of the Internet.  For the purposes of this 
discussion predators are any malicious agents that can cause damage to systems, applications and 
software connected to the Internet, and the prey are the same systems, application and software 
that can be damaged.  Predators come in a variety of species, some self propagate like worms 
and viruses, and others like denial of service attacks and Trojans are static, and there are hybrids 
of the two.  Depending on the behavior of the predatory species malicious attacks must be 
modeled differently in relation to how they interact with prey.  For the purposes of example 
Internet worms will be illustrated.  A worm, depending on how it is programmed, attacks specific 
species across the Internet.  For example the SQL slammer worm of January 2003 was 
programmed to attack Microsoft SQL server machines.  The worm only attacks one specific 
species and propagates itself through the attacked machines.  This method of propagation differs 
from what is seen in most predator prey models since prey are basically turned into a predator to 
attack other prey and in turn change them to predators.  While this behavior is not often seen in 
animals it is analogous to what happens with cancer at the cellular level.  A cancer infects a cell 
turning it into a cancer cell, which further propagates the cancer to other cells.  As a result 
predator and prey populations fluctuate on a quasi one to one basis, the predator population can 
only increase if a prey is converted to a predator.  The prey population on the other hand can 
increase from the removal of a predator or the production of additional prey connected to the 
Internet.   
 
A second key differentiator is the growth rates of predator and prey populations in the 
ecosystem.  Predators can have variable rates of growth.  A worm, for instance, can have an 
explosive rate of growth spreading across the entire ecosystem in as little as ten minutes (Moore 
et al 2003).  While the growth of worms is often highly rapid, their population decline can also 
happen quickly.  Worms most often affect network habitats that can evolve defense strategies 
very rapidly that block the worm through filters and/or patch the vulnerabilities in the prey, 
which allow the worm to propagate.  As a result worms can have a quick and often devastating 
effect on a prey population, but that high level of risk has led to the evolution of defenses that 
can mitigate the longevity of these predators. Viruses on the other hand tend to have a slower 
growth rate targeting end user habitats typically through email applications (species).  While 
viruses tend to propagate at a slower rate than worms their prey are typically less sophisticated in 
their defenses and slower to evolve.  Defense strategies for viruses typically come from anti-
virus software, but implementation of these defenses are many times left to end-users and are not 
often coordinated or evolve rapidly over time.  As a result viruses often persist with large 
populations for extended periods of time, often never completely disappearing until their prey 
becomes extinct.   
 
In may real world scenarios there is no warning for cyber attacks or what vulnerability may be 
exploited, thus there is no premeditated defense of the attack.  This leaves the difficult scenario 
of how does one defend a network when one does not know what the attack will be.  The 
predator prey analogy offers a means of defense through species diversification.  Since most 
predators can only effect one species at a time, the diversification of species in a network could 
provide a natural defense against attack.  This research will investigate what is the minimal 
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amount of diversification needed to prevent any one predator from having a catastrophic effect 
on an ecosystem.  A predator prey approach can be further developed to investigate how prey 
evolves defenses to predator attacks and how predators in turn evolve to thwart these defenses.  
It may be possible to simulate the evolutionary tracks of the predator prey relationship to 
discover how security and defense might best be maximized and predator populations 
minimized. 
 
PREDATOR-PREY M ETHODOLOGY 
  
The methodology of the approach will be to start with a simulated scale free network with 
12,000 vertices, in which all vertices a homogenous.  Next, 1% of those vertices will be 
randomly changed into a different species and the network will then be heterogeneous.  At this 
point a predator will be introduced to the population that only preys upon the new species, at this 
step only 1% of the population.  After the predator has spread through the susceptible prey 
population the number of disconnected vertices and the number of vertices with only one 
connection will be calculated.  Next, 2% of the vertices will be randomly seeded as the new prey 
population and the process will be repeated.  This process will be duplicated at 1% intervals until 
all the vertices in the network consist of the new species.  The results for this procedure are 
illustrated in figure2. 
 
Figure 2 – Number of Disconnected Vertices versus Size of Susceptible Prey Population with 
Random Seeding 
 
 
 
The number of disconnected vertices in the network increases linearly until 43% at which time 
there is an almost vertical jump.  The large jump in disconnected vertices coincides with the 
crossover with number of single edge vertices that experiences a complimentary steep drop.  The 
combination of steep numerical shift and cross over is indicative of a catastrophic failure in the 
network.  When 43% of the population becomes any single one species a single predator can 
cause traumatic damage to the total network.  At the 43% point there are more disconnected 
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vertices than single edge vertices and large parts of the networks can longer communicate with 
each other.  The same break point can be seen when the number of disconnected edges is plotted 
as seen in figure 3.   
 
Figure 3: Number of Disconnected Edges versus Size of Susceptible Prey Population for 
Random Seeding 
 
Another way to view the degradation of the network is by looking at the data by segregating 
vertices by their number of edges.  This was done by constructing a histogram with midpoints at 
25, 50, 100, 250, 500 edges per vertex.  The output of this approach can be seen in figure 4. 
 
Figure 3. Vertex Failures Segregated by Number of Edges for Random Seeding 
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The histogram approach illustrates that 25 average edges decreases most rapidly overall, while 
vertices with an average of 500 edges experiences a sharp drop after 20% of vertices are 
infected.  The effect on vertices with large number of edges is particularly important because of 
the heavy dependence on the vertices to connect the poorly connected vertices that constitute the 
majority of the network (Albert and Barabasi 2002).  The results do seem to indicate that vertices 
with higher connectivity are more resilient to increasingly susceptible prey populations. 
 
Another variation on this procedure is to use a targeted seeding of the prey population instead of 
a random seeding.  Specifically starting with the most connected vertex as the first member of 
the new species, and the second most connected, third most connected, and so on until the least 
connected vertex is turned into the new species.  The number of disconnected vertices and the 
number of single edge vertices is calculated for every 1% interval.  The results of this targeted 
approach are shown in figure 3. 
 
Figure 6 – Number of Disconnected Vertices versus Size of Susceptible Prey Population with 
Targeted Seeding 
 
The results of the targeted approach illustrate a far more rapid degradation of the network, an 
exponential increase in the number of the disconnected vertices versus the linear degradation 
seen in the random seeding.  Also the crossover point with the number of single edge vertices 
occurs far earlier around 17%, coinciding with the inflection point of the disconnected vertices 
curve.  While the simulation is not realistic it does demonstrate the point, that when a species 
clusters amongst the more connected vertices in a network it dramatically increases the 
vulnerability of that network.  The corollary to this result would be the more diversity in the core 
of the network the more robust the network.   Viewing the vertex degree histogram plot used 
with the random seeding approach reinforces this corollary.  The same distribution of average 
connectivity at 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 midpoints was again used, and is displayed in figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Vertex Failures Segregated by Number of Edges for Targeted Seeding 
 
The shape of disconnected vertex arc for the 25, 50, and 100 edges are all very similar, while the 
250 and 500 arcs down to zero almost immediately.  The rapid failures of highly connected 
vertices are directly correlated with the targeted seeding strategy.  In the targeted seeding 
strategy the most connected vertices are made susceptible first, so their rapid failure would be 
expected.  The rapid failure of the network in general is linked to the failure of the most 
connected nodes first.  This is reinforced when the number of disconnected edges is presented, 
seen in figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Number of Disconnected Edges versus Size of Susceptible Prey Population for 
Targeted Seeding 
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The targeted seeding results in an exponential loss of edges in the network, as opposed to the 
linear loss seen in the random scenario.  The finding reinforces that the greater homogeneity in 
the highly connected core the more vulnerable the network. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The findings of this preliminary research illustrate the security problems of reliance on a single 
network application (species).  The results should not been viewed as hard numbers, by which 
decisions could be based.  The approach is useful when questions arise if the market share of a 
particular company in a networked environment is causing security vulnerability on a macro 
scale.  Results could vary widely by network topology, type of attack, and vulnerability.  The 
particular network used for these simulations is indicative of a large number of critical global 
infrastructures, including the Internet at the router and autonomous system level and the World 
Wide Web.  The similarity of the network tested in this research to those critical infrastructures 
raises the question if monopoly or quasi monopoly conditions can contribute to national security 
vulnerabilities.  Further, if such vulnerabilities bear out is antitrust policy an appropriate 
response.  Antitrust regulation falls under the Sherman Act and specifically, the Supreme Court 
said in its Professional Engineers Case, 435 U.s. 679, 695 (1978):  
 
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will 
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. "The heart of our 
national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition." Standard 
Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248.   The assumption that competition is the best 
method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a 
bargain - quality, service, safety, and durability - and not just the immediate cost, 
are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.   
In this case the safety clause would be the part of legislation that specifically applies to network-
based applications.  When there is a lack of competition and a resulting lack of diversity this 
research points to a pronounced negative safety externality.  The interdependent and 
interconnected nature of network-based applications exacerbates the safety issue by affecting 
constituents who do not use the product or application. In the case of this research those 
constituencies are represented by the disconnected vertices and were the non-susceptible prey in 
each simulation. 
The problem of a growing lack of diversity in networks can be exacerbated by technology lock-
in, “A customer experiences “lock- in” when switching costs exceed the potential incremental 
value of alternative suppliers’ products over its current supplier’s product (Lookabough and 
Sicker 2003)”.  Lock- in has been a common technology strategy in recent years directed towards 
growing market share and producing stable revenue growth (add cite).  When a lock- in strategy 
aggregates across any one platform the result can be a non-optimal market creating 
interdependent security vulnerabilities and negative externalities.  Lookabough and Sicker 
(2003) state that, “security induced lock- in has resulted in convergence to a stable equilibrium 
that is not the globally optimal one” and point towards antitrust policy as one possible policy 
remedy. 
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Utilizing national security as a precedent to enforce antitrust policy to promote competition has 
historical grounding.  During World War II “na tional security was a potent weapon in the battle 
for both public investment and antitrust enforcement (Hart 1998)."  Interestingly US policy to 
date has gone in the other direction with their legislative efforts.  The Critical Infrastructure 
Security Act of 2001 (S 1456 IS) states that, “antitrust laws inhibit some companies from 
partnering with other industry members, including competitors, to develop cooperative 
infrastructure security strategies.”  While closer cooperation among industry actors is vital it is 
important not to shelve antitrust policy options in the process.  This research highlights the 
benefits of diversity in increasing the robustness of a network and there is a direct link between 
competition and increased diversity.  Antitrust is one policy tool that has been successfully used 
by the US government to promote national security in the past and it is possible that is could 
serve that purpose again. 
This is just one application of using a predator prey model to simulate the Internet.  The model is 
still rudimentary and needs further exploration, but the initial findings appear promising with 
interesting implications.  Future directions include examining real world networks, market 
shares, and vulnerabilities.  Also a deeper investigation of applying the Lotka-Volterra equation 
to real world virus and worm propagations could yield helpful understandings of how to 
minimize malicious attack damage in the future. 
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